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Purpose and Agenda 
• Purpose:  
– The overall purpose of this presentation is to present a summary of 
System Engineering (SE) lessons learned from previous 
failures/anomalies of deployable solar array structures and 
mechanisms to help avoid repeating the past failures for future solar 
array system development programs. 
– This presentation is based on a prior Glenn Research Center (GRC) 
Solar Electric Propulsion Technology Demonstration report , " Lessons 
Learned Summary of Deployable Structures /Appendages and 
Mechanisms" done by Mr. Thomas Kraft of GRC and Mr. Vipavetz in 
2012 
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Agenda 
•  Review of some failure history 
– Breakdown of failures by type of failure and cost of failure 
• Review four (4) common causes for anomalies/failures 
– Focus on the SE causes 
• Summary  
– Review key lessons learned/recommendations  
•    Key Solar Array Structure requirements 
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Satellite Failure History 
• Based on presentation at 2005 Space Power Workshop1, satellite 
reliability in orbit has been shown to be poor  
– Majority of claims coming from satellite bus – not from the launch vehicle 
• Solar array failures are a high % of overall satellite insurance costs  
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Power System Related Anomaly History 
• In a NASA GRC study on data obtained covering power failures of commercial 
and scientific satellites from 1990-2009 2, a high percentage of failures were 
associated with solar arrays mechanical failures and solar array 
wiring/interconnects 
 
 
% Power Failures – By Failure Type Cost of Failure – By Failure Type 
Page 6 
Leading Causes of Deployment Failures 
• There are many causes for failures of appendages, deployable 
structures and mechanisms, however these failures can be 
grouped into four general categories: 
1. Mechanical Loading 
– Ground transportation/launch/in-space loads 
2. On-orbit Space Environments 
3. Tribology (Mechanisms and Lubricants) 
4. Systems Engineering (Focus) 
– Requirements 
– Modeling/Analysis 
– Assembly, Integration and Testing 
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Challenges Associated w/ 
Requirements and Modeling/Analysis 
 Many problems occur due to a breakdown in systems  
 engineering, not a breakdown in individual core disciplines 
 
• Requirements: Specific challenges associated with requirements: 
– Poor requirements and verification management 
– Lack of highly skilled requirement writers 
– Poor requirements traceability and allocation 
– Poor configuration control of requirement changes and waivers 
– Lack of requirement ownership 
 
• Modeling/Analysis:  
– Large flexible structures are often highly non-linear in nature  
– Difficult to accurately model/predict actual loads/environments 
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Challenges Associated with 
Assembly, Integration & Testing (AI&T) 
• Common AI&T challenges associated with deployable 
structures/mechanisms:  
– The sheer size of solar array systems 
– Solar array workmanship issues 
– Size limitations of test facilities 
– Difficulty of representing the intended operating environment 3 
– Gravity off-loader used for ground deployment testing and associated test 
equipment can mask small forces encountered during deployment testing 
– Difficulty of minimizing effects of instrumentation during ground testing 
– Difficulty of evaluating venting during ground testing 3 
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Non-Space Environment 
Requirement Lessons  
• (SE LL1) Handling and ground transportation requirements 
– Graphite/epoxy and Kevlar/epoxy structures can be easily damage  
• (SE LL2) Launch mechanical load requirements 
– Large lightweight structures very susceptible  
– Wiring/interconnects/solder joints and switches are particularly susceptible 
– Items such as cables, tethers and insulation can move/shift unexpectedly during launch 
causing interference/jamming issues during operation/deployment 
• (SE LL3) Pyrotechnic shock requirements 
– Pyrotechnic shock can produce significant irreversible loads to surrounding 
systems/components 
– Smaller mechanisms/components are more susceptible 
– Flying debris/premature firing are areas of concern 
• (SE LL4) Plume loading requirements 
– Relatively small external loads, can vary dramatically as a function of thruster type, location, 
and operating conditions 
– Can have a substantial impact on spacecraft performance 
– Is growing contributor as the surface areas of arrays increase in size 
• (SE LL5) Attitude control load requirements 
– Spacecraft structural dynamical interactions with this can be very subtle and complex  
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Recommendations 
• (Recommendation SE1) Verify mechanical load margins are adequate “worst” 
case loadings 
– Use the largest possible margins of operation due to uncertainties in mechanical 
loads  
– Be especially sensitive to more fragile deployable structure sub-assemblies (solar 
cells, wiring/interconnects, solder joints and switches) 
• (Recommendation SE2) Use a mechanical devices, such as pins, skewers, or 
interlocking sections to secure items such as cables, tethers and blankets 
(constraints on system) 
•  (Recommendation SE3 ) Verify deployable structures/mechanisms can 
withstand pyrotechnic shocks   
– Also consider protection from flying debris 
• (Recommendation SE4 ) Identify externally induced in-space environments 
from your ConOps and incorporate into the system requirements 
– Special consideration should be given to plume loading due to its subtle but often 
complex nature 
• (Recommendation SE5) Develop  “Use Cases” based on ConOps scenarios to 
understand Attitude Control and their interactions.   
 
 
 
 
 
Page 11 
On-Orbit Space Environment 
Lessons 
• (SE LL6) Effects of hostile space environment (radiation, charging, arcing, heat 
dissipation, and microgravity) 
– Flexible solar arrays and mechanisms are particularly sensitive to the effects of space thermal, 
vacuum and “0-g” environments. 
• (SE LL7) Situational Awareness of space environment and critical operations 
– Periodic environmental disturbances such as geomagnetic storms can trigger an electrostatic 
discharge event  
– Micrometeoroid storms have severely damaged spacecraft/structure 
• (SE LL8) Dealing with the vacuum of space 
– Unvented honeycomb panels can entrap moisture and delaminate during ascent 
depressurization  
– Large lightweight structures especially vulnerable to venting issues 
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On-Orbit Space Environments 
Recommendations 
• (Recommendation SE6) Be aware of all hostile environmental effects and apply 
system requirements for worst-case space environments, particularly to vacuum, 
thermal and “0-G” effects 
– Special attention: 
» to differences in thermal expansion coefficients for deployable retention 
devices/release mechanisms. 
» to thermal effects on wiring, interconnects and solder joints 
» to thermal gradients in deployable structures/mechanisms 
• (Recommendation SE7) Use the ConOps for advanced mission/operations planning  
– Account for known periodic environmental disturbances and events such as 
geomagnetic and micro-meteoroid storms 
– Incorporate real-time video (or similar device) to visually monitor operation of deployable 
structures/mechanisms especially during critical operations 
• (Recommendation SE8) Ensure you have venting requirements 
– Verify lightweight flexible structures/blankets and composite honeycomb structures can 
vent rapid depressurization during ascent 
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Tribology (Mechanisms and Lubricants) 
Lessons 
• (SE LL9) Most deployable structure/mechanism anomalies are due to (1) insufficient 
torque margins (2) non-redundancy of motion producing elements (3) snagging (4) 
stiction (static friction) and binding 
– Friction forces not accounted for, thermal cases ignored, design sensitive to 
assembly/testing, improper lubrication 
• (SE LL10) Proper lubrication/coating selection  
– Ground tests failed to detect degraded lubrication because they behave differently on the 
ground and than in space 
– Material compatibility between lubricants and mechanisms have caused many failures 
– Lubrication migrating to unintended locations during storage/ground 
handling/transportation/testing/operation 
– Actual frictional characteristics of lubrication being significantly different than what was 
anticipated 
– Lubricants have degraded during long term storage/ground 
handling/transportation/testing/operation 
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Tribology Lessons 
• (SE LL11) Damage to hard coatings and lubricated surfaces  
– Micro-welding of high-load contact areas can occur when lubricating film fails 
on metal surfaces. 
– Vibration can break welds, producing debris/pitting preventing smooth 
operation of deployable structures/mechanisms 
– Occur due to excessive loading and relative vibration between two parts 
• (SE LL12) Many mechanisms have been damaged when they exceeded 
their end of travel limits during operation 
• (SE LL13) Many deployment switches not functioning properly in space 
– Switch devices will function properly in ground testing 
– Switch devices are sensitive to mounting orientation and microgravity 
– Limit switches are sensitive to thermal environment  
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Tribology  
Recommendations 
• (Recommendation SE9) Add the appropriate standards to system requirements  
Examples are : NASA Space Mechanisms Handbook, NASA-STD-5017 (Mechanisms), 
AIAA S-114-2005 (Moving Mechanical Assemblies) and Preferred Reliability Guidelines 
NO. GD-ED-2209 (Spacecraft Deployable Appendage Design) 
– Redundancy should be incorporated in motion producing devices/switches 
– Maintain proper clearances between adjacent components/devices 
– Self-aligning bearings should be used (where practicable) to preclude binding due to 
misalignments.  
– All ferrous material bearings should employ a corrosion-resistant steel 
– Recommended typical greases used in gear trains have been Bray 600, 601, 602, 3L-38 
– Maximize utilization of rolling surfaces in mechanisms 
•  Avoid slip joints 
– Use non-explosive pin pullers over pyrotechnic devices (high load carrying devices, do not eject 
particles and easy to incorporate redundancy) 
•  Minimum retraction force margin of 100% at worst-case environmental conditions should 
be maintained 
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Tribology 
Recommendations 
• (Recommendation SE10) Validate and verify the selected lubricants using NASA 
Space Mechanisms Handbook for guidelines 
– “Wet” grease lubrication is generally preferred over “dry” lubrication. The grease with the 
most heritage is good choice for many space applications 
• Such as Braycote 600 series, a synthetic-fluorinated oil-thickened grease with micron-
size Teflon powder.  
• Grease has low out gassing and minimal contamination concerns for space application 
(temp range: -80 °C to 200 °C) 
– For extreme low temperatures and cryogenic applications, consider solid 
lubricants  
• (Recommendation SE11) Contact stress of mating surfaces should not be great 
enough to cause plastic deformation and/or destroy applied coatings to prevent 
lubrication failure and subsequent binding/seizure 
• (Recommendation SE12) Add system reliability requirements for stopping  
• (Recommendation SE13) Follow NASA Space Mechanisms Handbook Mechanism 
and Deployed Appendage design guidelines when incorporating switches/sensors 
Page 17 
Modeling/Analysis Lessons 
• (SE LL14) Immature or inadequate modeling/analysis of environments and 
dynamic loading has caused many deployable structures/mechanisms 
failures 
• (SE LL15) Deployable structures and mechanisms are often extremely 
difficult to accurately model/analyze, especially for large, lightweight 
structures 
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Modeling/Analysis 
Recommendations 
• (Recommendation SE14) Develop detailed deployable structures 
mechanism models and analysis that are validated 
– Follow “Flight Loads Analysis as a Spacecraft Design Tool”, “Structural Stress 
Analysis”, “Thermal Analysis”, Reliability Practice number PD-AP-1317, 1318 
and 2302, from NASA Technical Memorandum 4322A, while developing and 
verifying models/simulations/analysis 
– Validate models/simulations/analysis with corresponding test data where 
possible 
– Perform torque margin, kinematic, dynamic, clearance, structural, control, 
thermal and plume analysis early on and continue to model through program 
to confirm requirement compliance 
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Modeling/Analysis 
Recommendations 
• (Recommendation SE15) When developing and validating deployable 
structure/mechanism models, simulations and analysis: 
– Capture realistic thermal gradients  
– Properly characterize wire harness stiffness across joints to accurately estimate 
resistive torques  
– Make sure effects of small forces due to friction, gravity and aerodynamic 
resistance have been captured 
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Assembly and Integration  
Lessons 
• (SE LL16) Technical integration, communication and documentation are crucial to the 
build process  
– 70 to 80% of all problems encountered in assembly and integration are caused by a lack of 
good systems or technical integration planning 
– Many deployable structure/mechanism problems associated with workmanship errors; 
wiring/interconnects/solder joints and switches  
• (SE LL17) Mishandling or excessive handling incidents 
– Composite structures, large flexible array panels/solar cells and thin, lightweight 
tethers/cables/lanyards are susceptible to ground handling damage 
– High voltage array blankets are especially susceptible to handling damage  
– Lubricants/coatings especially vulnerable to pre-launch storage mishandling  
• (SE LL18) Last minute assembly and integration steps can lead to failures to 
deployable structures and mechanisms 
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Assembly and Integration 
Recommendations 
• (Recommendation SE16) Rigorous and comprehensive assembly and integration 
process should be developed and followed throughout 
– Make sure loose, non-serialized materials are carefully accounted for during assembly 
– Keep accurate records of all “non-flight” installations 
– Take photos/video frequently during assembly and Integration 
– Keep hardware closed when access is not needed 
• (Recommendation SE17) Establish safe handling procedures early in program  
– Procedures should be reviewed by safety personnel prior to assembly/integration 
– Deployable structures/mechanisms should be self supporting when placed in any 
orientation relative to gravity while in storage or deployed configuration 
– Conduct safety planning and dress rehearsals before handling  
• (Recommendation SE 18) Verify final assembly operations, particularly on 
deployable structures and mechanisms that are single-point-failure risks 
– Pay particular attention to possible connector mismating  
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Testing 
Lessons 
• (SE LL19) Flight failures due to lack of appropriate test levels and sequences in a 
flight environment 
– Many failures attributed to testing under non-realistic environmental 
conditions 
• (SE LL20) Flight failures due to lack of good ground testing structures 
• (SE LL21) Capturing stiffness at critical interfaces such as at deployable structure 
and spacecraft interface is critical to accurately predicting response during testing 
and verifying that flexible materials, such as wires and thermal blankets, will not 
jam deployable/mechanism 
– Many failures occurred due to improper characterization of wire harness 
stiffness across joints during ground deployment testing 
• (SE LL22) Modeling is not testing, this is analysis (can be used to help testing) 
• (SE LL23) Interference of ground test equipment 
– Ground test equipment, especially for large flexible structures, can mask kinematic 
performance and seemingly small forces providing false confidence in reliability  
– Ground test equipment can also introduce artificial constraints and forces 
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Testing 
Recommendations  
• (Recommendation SE19) All tests should follow “test-as-you-fly” 
– Test in your flight environment 
– Standards need to be part of the test plan 
– Requirements should call the standards needed for compliance  
• (Recommendation SE20) Have I&T leads involved with requirements development to 
consider designs to enhance ground tests to meet specs and environments  
– Tests need to be verifiable in 1 G test conditions  
– Tests should be done without the assistance of gravity  
• (Recommendation SE21) Test the deployable structure/mechanism to the highest 
possible sub-system/system level  
• (Recommendation SE22) Push for failure mode testing to accurately identify/verify the 
failure modes predicted for the deployable/mechanism 
– Verify all redundant components/modes of operation 
• (Recommendation SE23) Identify ground equipment interference and compensate or 
eliminate 
– Ground test equipment needs to be designed to accurately simulate the effects of micro-gravity 
during deployment 
– Be aware of other effects that ground test equipment could have onto test hardware (artificial 
thermal gradients during thermal testing) 
 
Note: Provide sufficient resources and time to support testing 
 - First to be cut due to schedule and always under estimated  
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International Space Station 
The following couple of lessons are from “Lessons Learned from ISS 
Solar Array Operations and Implications for Future Missions” 
presentation from Michael Grygier, Structural Engineering Division, 
NASA Johnson Space Center 
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ISS Solar Array Configuration 
International Space 
Station 
Solar Array Wing 
(SAW) (x8) 
~115’ 
~ 37’ 
Solar  Alpha Rotary  
Joint (SARJ) 
Beta Gimbal  
Assembly  (BGA) (x8) 
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SARJ Tooth Crash 
Stepper Motor 
Lock Rack 
Bull Gear Torque Motor 
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SARJ Crash Recovery 
• SARJ Toothcrash Recovery commands the SARJ in a stepper motor 
fashion, inducing vibrations into the entire outboard truss and solar 
arrays 
– This was not analyzed pre-flight.  
–  Post-flight reconstructions have shown that the actual excitation and 
loads are fairly benign but adds 10 minutes to mission ops planning 
timelines 
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Shadowing 
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Shadowing  
  
       Shadowing of a single longeron can cause a catastrophic hazard 
 
• Thermal structural loads build over time 
• Loads can exceed mast buckling limit in ~30 minutes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Shadow on longeron #1 causes it to be cooler than the other three 
• Due to all four longerons being attached to the same relatively rigid plane, a 
loading condition is established 
• #1 pulls the tipshell toward the canister 
• Causing 2 and 4 to go into compression and 3 in tension 
• The compression load can lead to a buckling failure 
 
3 
Canister 
1 2 
4 
Tipshell 
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Thruster Effects 
Two truss cameras capture 3-D Solar Array tip motion while excited by thruster firings 
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Recommendations 
• Solar array wing/motor controller systems need to be analyzed 
dynamically with the flex model included to verify loads in the solar 
arrays are acceptable for nominal as well as contingency operations 
 
• Preventive shadowing should be incorporated as part of solar array 
wing designs  
 
• Do not underestimate the different operational scenarios requiring the 
solar array position to be controlled to some other position than the 
optimal power-generating position: Plume Loads, Mechanical Loads, 
Thermal Loads, Erosion/Contamination, Vehicle maneuvers 
–  Don’t place arrays near attitude control thrusters 
 
• Mast structures should have adequate margins that will sufficient 
structural integrity even after some damage is sustained 
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Hubble Telescope 
• From a Space Telescope Feasibility Study showing a requirement 
violation 
• Result:  the small-diameter bi-STEM booms buckled in space   
• Always validate and verify your requirements 
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Requirement Considerations 
Requirements are all about communication, communication, 
communication! 
• Avoid multi- requirement statements 
– Use single concise requirement statements 
– Include rationales for rustication, history, and further clarification  
• Assign requirement ownership and accountability 
– They will track, monitor and verify compliance 
• All requirements should have traceability and requirement flow down 
• System requirements should reflect the entire life cycle 
• The LaRC LMS-CP-5526 (Product Requirements Development and 
Management Procedures) is a quick and excellent guide to requirements 
management and development (call me, I can email you a copy)  
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Requirement Definition 
 
• Develop an end-to-end concept of operations to fully understand your 
operating environment 
 
• Develop a complete system architecture based on the concept of 
operations 
 
• Define your system requirements based on the concept of  operations 
and science and program requirements 
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Interfaces a Special Consideration 
• Ensure interfaces between organizations are worked out in detail, agreed to 
by both sides and documented 
– Assign a dedicated and accountable engineer to assure the hardware being built 
matches the Interface Control Documents (ICDs) 
– Ensure cognizant engineers verify consistency between their hardware and the 
ICDs/ drawings, and provide proper notification of interface changes 
– Use vendor ICDs where applicable 
– Do not maintain two sets of ICDs 
• Recognize the importance of contamination-control engineering during every 
phase of hardware design and development  
– Establish quantitative cleanliness requirements to control particulate and 
molecular contamination 
• Proper installation and assembly should be verifiable and easily inspected 
– If not have good photos and video 
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Some Standard and Guideline 
Recommendations  
• General recommendation: Use the following when developing system 
engineering processes for deployable structures/mechanisms:  
– NPR 7123.1B (NASA Systems Engineering, SE Processes and 
Requirements),    
– NASA/SP-2007-6105 (SE Handbook) 
– Then develop and implement a Systems Engineering Management Plan 
• General recommendation: In addition, the following documents contain good 
standards, guidelines, and processes: 
–  CxP 70135 Structural Design and Verification Document,  
– NASA-STD-5017 Space Mechanisms, 
–  NASA-STD-5019 MSFC-RQMT-3479 Fracture Control,  
– AIAA S-114-2005 Moving Mechanical Assemblies and Preferred Reliability 
Guidelines NO. GD-ED-2209 
– GT-TE-2403 Spacecraft Deployable Appendage Design and Test Guidelines 
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Applying Technical Management 
Processes 
Stakeholder 
Expectations Definition
Technical 
Requirements Definition
Technical 
Solution Definition
• Logical Decomposition
• Physical Solution
Planning
Assessment
Control
Decision
Analysis
Transition
Design Realization
Product Verification
Product Validation
Design Processes
Technical Management  Processes
Realization Processes
Design Output Realization Input
Design 
Input
Realization 
Output
Feedback
Iteration 
Loops
Feedback
Iteration 
Loops
Hubble 
 
I&T, Ground Test Equipment Lessons Learned, ConOps,  
Science and Program requirements 
Flow down 
 to subsystems  
Modeling and Analysis 
Tribology, Loads,  
Environments, 
Standards  
I&T 
Interfaces, Contamination 
Materials , 
Lubricants Selection 
Environments 
ISS 
Stakeholder  
Satisfaction 
Models 
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Key Solar Array Structures 
Requirements 
• The following are key requirements associated with Solar Array 
Structures: 
– Packing efficiency 
– Mass 
– Reliability 
– Structural (Thermal-Mechanical) Stability 
– Pointing and Control 
– Solar Array Specific Power  
– Solar Array Stowed Power 
– Scalability  
– Feasibility 
– Cost 
• Essential to have a mission scenario and design reference 
mission defined 
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Summary 
 
 
• Numerous lessons learned from deployable structures and mechanism 
failures across multiple NASA agencies/industry/DOD have been 
summarized in this presentation 
– The purpose is to increase awareness of previous failures so we don’t repeat 
past mistakes 
– And to help develop guidelines/requirements for development of future NASA 
deployable structures and mechanisms 
• Currently these lessons learned are being applied and assessed against  
Solar Array Structures (SAS) involved with NASA Research 
Announcements for  solar array research and development  
– Supports requirement development process, evaluation of solar array designs 
and support development/evaluation of test plan for solar arrays/mechanisms 
– Continue SAS lessons learned updates and presentations 
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